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ROBERT POST 
Theories of Constitutional 
Interpretation 
Modern democracy invites us to replace the notion of a regime founded upon laws, of a 
legitimate power, by the notion of a regime founded upon the legitimacy of a debate 
as to what is legitimate and what is illegitimate-a debate which is necessarily 
without any guarantor and without any end. 
-Claude Lefort' 
IN 1979 ERNEST CHAMBERS was a barber who had for nine years rep- 
resented a predominantly black district of Omaha in the Nebraska Unicameral 
Legislature. He had been brought up in "a religious strait-jacket" in the funda- 
mentalist Church of God and Christ, but as he had grown older he had come to 
renounce Christianity and all belief in God. Consequently he was uncomfortable 
when the chaplain hired by the legislature opened each session with prayer. In 
fact he felt compelled to leave the legislative chamber, so that he and the chaplain 
were "almost in a race to see whether" the chaplain could "get to the front before" 
Chambers could "get out the back door."2 
The chaplain of the Nebraska Legislature during that time was Robert E. 
Palmer, a Presbyterian clergyman who had ministered to the legislators since 
1965. His prayers were short, almost perfunctory. He strove to make them non- 
sectarian, to reflect 'just civil religion in America," which he understood to consist 
of "the Judeo-Christian tradition," the "kind of religious expressions that are 
common to the vast, overwhelming majority of most all Americans." He viewed 
the purpose of his prayers to be the provision of "an opportunity for Senators to 
be drawn closer to their understanding of God as they understand God, in order 
that the divine wisdom might be theirs as they conduct their business for the day." 
And so he would, for example, pray "in the name of Jesus-our Friend, our 
Saviour, our Example, our Guide," and he would "ask" that the Senators come to 
realize that "they are part of the team working together to win the game for the 
benefit of the people of this state."3 
Chambers attempted to convince his colleagues to end the practice of legis- 
lative prayer. When they refused, he took the characteristically American step of 
filing suit in federal court. His claim was elegantly simple: the payment of a state 
salary to the minister of a single Christian denomination for fourteen years for 
the purpose of offering official prayers to the state legislature was a violation of 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Consti- 
tution. That clause provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab- 
lishment of religion."4 
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The trial court held that while the payment of the chaplain's salary violated 
the Establishment Clause, the observance of legislative prayer did not.5 The 
appellate court went even further and declared that the whole "prayer practice" 
was unconstitutional. The case was then accepted for decision by the United 
States Supreme Court, by which time the concrete concerns of Ernest Chambers 
and Robert Palmer had dwindled to little or no moment. Chambers's lawsuit had 
become merely a medium through which the Court could ponder the legal 
meaning for the entire nation of the Establishment Clause. The methods by 
which the Court ascertains this constitutional meaning are of the utmost legal 
and political importance. Ernest Chambers's lawsuit would prove to be the occa- 
sion for an unusually clear and dramatic display of these methods. 
I 
Sometimes, although rarely, the words of the Constitution appear to 
speak for themselves. In such circumstances the Constitution does not seem to 
require interpretation. Article I, Section 3, Clause 1 of the Constitution, for 
example, states that "the Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State." If a third California Senator should one day present 
herself for accreditation in Washington, D.C., no court in the country would think 
twice before disapproving of the application. From a phenomenological point of 
view, there would be no question of "interpreting" the constitutional anguage, 
for its meaning and application would appear clear and obvious.7 
The most famous expression of the experience of this clarity is by Justice 
Owen Roberts, who in 1936 wrote that the "judicial branch of the government 
has only one duty,-to lay the article of the Constitution which is involved beside 
the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the 
former."8 In legal circles, this approach is sometimes characterized as a "plain 
meaning" or "textualist" theory of interpretation. Yet, strictly speaking, the 
approach is not a theory at all; it is instead a description of what happens when 
constitutional meaning is not problematic. 
But if for any reason that meaning has become questionable, it is no help at 
all to instruct a judge to follow the "plain meaning" of the constitutional text. A 
meaning that has ceased to be plain cannot be made so by sheer force of will.9 In 
Chambers's lawsuit, for example, either the meaning of the Establishment Clause 
with respect to the issue of legislative prayer is "plain," or it is not. If the latter, 
the question of constitutional meaning cannot be resolved by staring harder at 
the ten words of the clause. What is required instead is a means of interpreting 
the text so as to mediate between the clause and its application.'0 
Because judges must be able to justify their decisions, they must also be able 
to justify the means of interpretation that they employ to reach those decisions, 
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particularly if their choice affects the ultimate result or significance of a case. 
Judges must be able to explain why they have decided to interpret the Constitu- 
tion through one set of inquiries rather than another. In legal (although not in 
philosophical or literary) parlance, judges require and must be able to articulate 
a "theory" of constitutional interpretation. 
Any such theory of interpretation, however, must accommodate itself to the 
role of judicial review within American democracy. When a court sets aside a 
statute as unconstitutional, it in essence deems the statute invalid in the name of 
the Constitution. Courts have claimed the power to do this because, in the famous 
words of John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, the decision that established the 
institution ofjudicial review, "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judi- 
cial department to say what the law is."" l The implicit premise of this claim is that 
the Constitution is a form of "law," just like the law which courts ordinarily inter- 
pret and apply. Fidelity to law is a preeminent value in a nation that, as Marshall 
put it in Marbury, prides itself in being "a government of laws, and not of men."' 2 
But, as the force of Marshall's argument in Marbury also required him to 
acknowledge, the Constitution is something more than ordinary law; it is "the 
fundamental and paramount law of the nation." The Constitution is "funda- 
mental" because it is the vehicle through which "the people . .. establish, for their 
future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to 
their own happiness." The Constitution is therefore "the basis on which the whole 
American fabric has been erected."' 3 The question arises, therefore, why it 
should be the province and duty of the federal judiciary to discern in that "Amer- 
ican fabric" the "principles" and "opinion" of "the people," when that judiciary is 
not elected by and hence structurally responsible to the people. Why shouldn't 
that task be allocated instead to the democratically elected branches of govern- 
ment, which are presumptively in closer contact with the popular mind? 
This question, which is sometimes termed the "counter-majoritarian" diffi- 
culty,'4 has proved durable enough to sustain the work of generations of con- 
stitutional scholars. The question makes a powerful political point. Judicial de- 
terminations of unconstitutionality nullify the actions of democratically elected 
branches of government. Such determinations are for all practical purposes final; 
often the only formal recourse is the cumbersome and impractical process of 
constitutional amendment. "Who are these nine Justices," one may well have 
asked the Court in 1857 after the Dred Scott decision,'5 "so definitively to instruct 
the nation about the 'American fabric'?" 
II 
The United States Supreme Court voted 6 to 3 against Ernest Cham- 
bers. If one were simply to view the Constitution as ordinary law, this outcome 
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would have been something of a surprise. The relevant precedents of the Court 
pointed unambiguously to the unconstitutionality of the practice of legislative 
prayer. As Justice William J. Brennan pointed out in his dissent, it is "obvious 
that, if the Court were to judge legislative prayer through the unsentimental eye 
of our settled doctrine, it would have to strike it down as a clear violation of the 
Establishment Clause."''6 
In ordinary adjudication, courts follow the principle of stare decisis, which is 
to say that they follow the doctrinal rules laid down in controlling precedents.'7 
In American law, the principle constitutes a fundamental aspect of "the rule of 
law,"' 8 for it requires courts to decide cases on the basis of public and predictable 
rules, applied in an even-handed manner, upon which persons can rely in the 
conduct of their lives.'9 In constitutional adjudication, "adherence to precedent 
can contribute to the important notion that the law is impersonal in character, 
that the Court believes itself to be following a 'law which binds [it] as well as the 
litigants.' "20 The principle of stare decisis helps to ensure that our constitutional 
order retains the kind of stability and continuity that are prerequisite for insti- 
tutional legitimacy. 
If the Court in Ernest Chambers's case had followed the principle of stare 
decisis, it would have deemed controlling, as did the Court of Appeals below,2' the 
three-part doctrinal test laid down in Lemon v. Kurtzman:22 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria devel- 
oped by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, 
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 
an excessive government entanglement with religion." 
The primary purpose of religious prayer cannot reasonably be deemed to be 
secular; nor can its principal effect be understood as anything other than en- 
hancing religion. As for the potential for "excessive government entanglement 
with religion," it is apparent that official sponsorship of prayer necessarily entan- 
gles the state in decisions about which forms of prayer are appropriate or inap- 
propriate. The word was passed to Reverend Palmer, for example, that Jewish 
senators in the Nebraska Legislature were offended by his many references to 
Christ.23 Eighty years before, when a state senator conveyed a similar message to 
the legislative chaplain of the State Senate of California, a local clergyman thun- 
dered that the senator's "words were those of an irreverent and godless man" and 
that his offense was a "crowning infamy."24 The point of the "entanglements" 
prong of the Lemon rule is to ensure that the state not be embroiled in religious 
quarrels of this kind. 
"In sum," as Justice Brennan remarked, "I have no doubt that, if any group 
of law students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of 
legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be uncon- 
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stitutional."25 A fascinating aspect of the Chambers decision, however, is that the 
majority neither disagreed with this assessment, nor attempted to alter the Lemon 
doctrine. In fact it ignored Lemon altogether, making no effort whatever tojustify 
its decision by reference to past precedents. 
Instead the Court, in an opinion written by ChiefJustice Warren Burger and 
joined by five other Justices, focused its analysis on the fact that the "opening of 
sessions of legislative and other deliberative bodies with prayer is deeply 
embedded in the history and tradition of this country." The Court noted that 
most States of the Union have traditionally opened their legislative sessions with 
prayer, and that Congress has continuously employed chaplains to offer legisla- 
tive prayer since the eighteenth century. Indeed, on 22 September 1789, three 
days before Congress approved the language of the First Amendment (and the 
Establishment Clause) and sent it to the States for ratification, Congress enacted 
a statute providing for the payment of congressional chaplains.26 
Although the Court conceded that "standing alone, historical patterns cannot 
justify contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees," it concluded that 
the evidence in Chambers's case was different, for it definitely established "not 
only ... what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also 
... how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First 
Congress-their actions reveal their intent." "Clearly," the Court concluded, "the 
men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not view paid legis- 
lative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment."27 
The premise of the majority's opinion is thus that the meaning of the Con- 
stitution is better ascertained through strong evidence of the intent of the Fram- 
ers than through fidelity to past precedents and doctrine. The reason is 
apparently that the intent of the Framers best embodies those "principles" which 
the "people" desired to instantiate in their Constitution. In the eyes of the 
majority, therefore, it is more important that the Constitution be interpreted in 
a manner which accurately expresses these principles than that it be interpreted 
in a manner which remains faithful to the principle of stare decisis.28 
The principle of stare decisis, moreover, is inconsistent with a quite different 
method of constitutional interpretation. William Brennan, in a dissent joined by 
one other Justice, also gave only cursory attention to the rules of Lemon. In fact 
he appeared to agree with the majority that "the path of formal doctrine. . . can 
only imperfectly capture the nature and importance of the issues at stake in this 
case."29 But rather than focusing on the intentions of the Framers of the First 
Amendment, Brennan offered instead an "account" of "the underlying function 
of the Establishment Clause" and of the relationship between that function and 
the practice of legislative prayer. 
According to Brennan, the Establishment Clause embodies the twin princi- 
ples of "separation between church and state" and "neutrality" as between diverse 
religions. These two principles, in turn, serve four purposes. They guarantee "the 
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individual right to conscience" by ensuring that persons are not coerced to sup- 
port (through taxes or otherwise) religious practices with which they disagree; 
they "keep the state from interfering in the essential autonomy of religious life"; 
"they prevent the trivialization and degradation of religion by too close an attach- 
ment to the organs of government"; and they "help assure that essentially reli- 
gious issues, precisely because of their importance and sensitivity, not become the 
occasion for battle in the political arena."30 
Brennan convincingly demonstrated that Nebraska's authorization of legis- 
lative prayer was inconsistent with each of these four purposes. Indeed, as 
Brennan noted, the majority said "almost nothing contrary to" this functional 
analysis, relying instead almost entirely on evidence of the historical intent of the 
Framers. The majority ultimately differed from the dissent, therefore, neither on 
the application of doctrine nor on the function of the Establishment Clause, 
but rather on the relevance of evidence of original intent for constitutional 
interpretation. 
Brennan explicitly rejected such evidence as definitive of constitutional 
meaning, arguing that "the Constitution is not a static document whose meaning 
on every detail is fixed for all time by the life experience of the Framers." He 
contended that the Constitution must be understood instead as "a document 
meant to last for the ages," the bearer of an "inherent adaptability" that could not 
be cabined by any "static and lifeless" meaning. His proposed analysis of the 
Establishment Clause's "underlying function" was meant to illustrate how courts 
could discern the contemporary significance of "the majestic generalities of the Bill 
of Rights."'3' His dissent pictured the Constitution as a living, evolving entity, 
whose full meaning could be ascertained neither by doctrinal precedent nor by 
evidence of original intent. The dissent, therefore, was predicated upon yet a 
third form of constitutional interpretation. 
The outcome of Ernest Chambers's lawsuit thus appears as a triangular struc- 
ture, in which three distinct theories of interpretation compete for control of the 
Constitution. In one corner is a form of interpretation that strives to implement 
the Constitution through the articulation of explicit doctrinal rules. In a second 
corner is a form of interpretation that attempts to construe the Constitution to 
reflect the original intent of its Framers. In yet a third corner is a form of inter- 
pretation that reads the Constitution in a manner designed to express the deepest 
contemporary purposes of the people. Each of these three theories is immedi- 
ately recognizable and familiar to those who practice constitutional adjudication. 
III 
The purpose of constitutional adjudication is to assess the constitu- 
tional validity of state actions, like the hiring of legislative chaplains. But courts 
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can achieve this purpose only to the extent they have the authority to evaluate, in 
the name of the Constitution, the validity of otherwise perfectly legal state actions. 
Every act of constitutional interpretation invokes and depends upon this au- 
thority, and for this reason "constitutional interpretation is essentially about the 
sources of authority in American political life."32 What in fact distinguishes the 
three theories of interpretation displayed in Chambers-theories that I shall 
respectively call "doctrinal," "historical," and "responsive" interpretation-is that 
each appeals to a different conception of constitutional authority. 
The authority of law. There is, first, the authority of the Constitution as law. 
The Constitution controls state actions because the Constitution is the highest 
law, above all merely quotidian state activity. The concept of the "constitution as 
hard law, law written in virtually capital letters (LAW), law as meaning reliable 
law," has been termed "by far the most important idea of the Constitution."33 
Because "courts are the mere instruments of the law,"34 they are peculiarly fitted 
to interpret a Constitution whose authority lies in its character as law. It is there- 
fore no accident that in Marbury Marshall appealed precisely to this image of 
constitutional authority in establishing the institution ofjudicial review. 
If the Constitution predominates because it is law, its interpretation must be 
constrained by the values of the rule of law, which means that courts must con- 
strue it through a process of reasoning that is replicable, that remains fairly stable, 
and that is consistently applied.35 In American adjudication the principle of stare 
decisis has been an essential component of the rule of law.36 The principle is of 
particular importance on those occasions when constitutional adjudication in- 
volves vague textual referents (like "equal protection of the laws," or "due process 
of law"), with regard to which there is "only limited evidence of exactly how the 
Framers intended the [text] to apply."37 On these occasions the principle of stare 
decisis holds courts to a consistent and stable interpretation of Constitution. 
Without such consistency and stability, it would be difficult o understand the 
Constitution as having any existence as law. Suppose, for example, that the 
Supreme Court were to decide one day in decision A that the practice of legisla- 
tive prayer was constitutional, perhaps because in its view the Framers had so 
intended. Imagine that a month later the Court were to decide in decision B, 
without any reference to A, that the practice was unconstitutional, perhaps 
because the Court's view of the Framers' intent had changed. And assume that 
one month later the Court were to determine in decision C, without any reference 
to A or B, that the practice was partially constitutional, perhaps because its 
reading of the historical evidence had once again altered. In such circumstances 
state legislators would simply not know what to do; they would have no rule of 
law by which to decide whether or not they could constitutionally hire legislative 
chaplains.38 
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It is of course implausible to suppose that the Court would so swiftly and 
radically change its assessment of the historical evidence. But the question is 
whether this implausibility derives from the unequivocal state of the historical 
record, or rather from the Court's implicit obligation to remain faithful to its own 
prior determinations. Since historical evidence is often equivocal, particularly 
with respect to matters of contemporary constitutional moment, it is the latter 
obligation, I would suggest, that plays an important role in enabling courts to 
create stable and predictable rules upon which persons can rely in the arrange- 
ment of their lives and institutions.39 This obligation receives formal acknowl- 
edgement in the principle of stare decisis. 
This means that the principle of stare decisis often underlies the capacity of 
constitutional adjudication to generate a system of constitutional aw. Thus the 
Chambers decision creates a rule of constitutional aw only because of the implicit 
commitment of the Court to act in the future in ways that are consistent with the 
Chambers holding. Put another way, the legal implications of Chambers depend 
upon the implicit and necessary expectation that the Court will in the future treat 
Chambers in a way that it declined in Chambers to treat Lemon.40 
Of course the principle of stare decisis is an immensely flexible instrument, 
allowing courts to treat precedents on the one hand as the source of specific and 
binding formal rules,4' or on the other as an amorphous mass of material to be 
rendered consistent through the virtue of "integrity."42 What every application of 
the principle requires, however, is that a court focus its analysis on the doctrine 
which has emerged from relevant prior cases. The principle of stare decisis there- 
fore creates a chain of cases, in which each decision is an interpretation of imme- 
diately prior decisions. 
Construing the Constitution in a manner that is faithful to its authority as law 
thus leads to what I shall call "doctrinal" interpretation. The implication of doc- 
trinal interpretation is that the actual text of the Constitution is remitted to one 
end of a growing line of precedents. Even if the very first judicial decision to 
interpret the Establishment Clause had concentrated its attention on the specific 
words of the Clause or the intentions of its Framers, the practice of doctrinal 
interpretation would require the second decision to focus chiefly on the meaning 
of the first decision, the third decision chiefly on the meaning of the second, and 
so forth. In this process the text of the Constitution recedes until, as one promi- 
nent commentator has put it, it comes to seem "rather like ... a remote ancestor 
who came over on the Mayflower."43 
The vast majority of constitutional decisions rely primarily upon doctrinal 
interpretation. Novices are often quite struck by the relative absence of the 
Constitution from constitutional opinions, which seem oriented instead toward 
specific doctrinal "tests," like the Lemon tests, derived from prior judicial deci- 
sions. But this should be no surprise if the most powerful justification for the 
Constitution's authority is that it is law, and the most defensible justification for 
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judicial review is that it is the peculiar province and duty of the courts to ex- 
pound the law. 
The authority of consent. If doctrinal interpretation rests on the equation of 
constitutional authority with law, what I shall call "historical interpretation" rests 
instead on the equation of constitutional authority with consent. The story is 
simple and familiar. The Framers of the Constitution proposed a compact to limit 
the power of government; the people signified their agreement to that compact 
by their ratification of the Constitution, and that agreement is what gives the 
Constitution its authority. The interpretation of the Constitution should there- 
fore be designed to give effect to the terms of that original act of agreement. 
The story behind historical interpretation has enormous resonance in a lib- 
eral society like our own. It conceives of the Constitution as binding in the same 
way that a promise is binding, as a single voluntary act of willful self-regulation. 
In interpreting such a Constitution courts can portray themselves as merely the 
passive enforcers of the democratic will that "ordained and established" the Con- 
stitution. Thus, as former Attorney General Edwin Meese III could observe, "A 
Jurisprudence of Original Intention ... reflects a deeply rooted commitment to 
the idea of democracy. The Constitution represents the consent of the governed 
to the structures and powers of the government. The Constitution is the funda- 
mental will of the people; that is why it is the fundamental law."44 
Different variants of historical interpretation emphasize different forms of 
evidence as probative of that original exercise of "fundamental will." Thus for 
some commentators the constitutional "text" is a privileged form of evidence, 
because "the text is the intention of the authors or of the framers";45 whereas for 
others the "relevant inquiry must focus on the public understanding of the lan- 
guage when the Constitution was developed."46 By far the most common form of 
historical interpretation, and the one used by Chief Justice Burger in Chambers, 
regards the intentions of the Framers as the best evidence of the agreement rep- 
resented by the Constitution.47 
This form of historical interpretation has become quite controversial in 
recent years, in part because some members of the resurgent Right have at- 
tempted to use historical interpretation as a means of constricting the discretion 
of supposedly liberal judges. The notion is that judges will have less room to 
maneuver if they are bound to the specific factual intentions of the Framers. But 
this notion is a vulgar misinterpretation of the principles of historical interpre- 
tation, as is elegantly illustrated by an example suggested by Paul Freund. Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution gives to Congress the power "to make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces." It can 
be said with complete certainty that no one in the eighteenth century had the 
intent to endow Congress with the power to make rules for the regulation of an 
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air force. But no reasonable person would conclude from this undisputed fact 
that Congress does not now have this power.48 This is because the intent behind 
the Clause would naturally be understood as giving Congress the power to reg- 
ulate the "military" or the "armed forces," or some other such general concept. 
The point of Freund's example is that the intent of the Framers cannot be 
understood as the kind of simple historical fact that resists interpretation. It must 
instead be conceived as a purpose which can be characterized in terms that are 
more or less general.49 Once this move is taken, however, historical interpretation 
assumes a flexibility inimical to the political purposes of the Right. 
Historical interpretation is a rather uncommon phenomenon in modern con- 
stitutional adjudication. In part this may be due to the logical and evidentiary 
difficulties involved in the effort to unearth historical intentions. It is hard 
enough to ascertain the intentions of a living individual. It is harder still to deter- 
mine the intention of a group of living individuals, like a legislature or a Con- 
gress. The difficulty is compounded when the group of individuals is two 
centuries remote in time and the evidence of their thoughts and purposes is scat- 
tered, fragmentary, ambiguous, and conflicting. And the task is made almost 
impossible when the relevant intentions pertain to questions which in all proba- 
bility never occurred to that group of individuals and which are meaningful only 
in light of circumstances that would to them be inconceivable. 
It is the rare case indeed that, like Chambers, eems to present strong evidence 
of original intention on the precise question to be adjudicated. Even in such a 
case, as Brennan points out in his dissent, the logic of democratic consent requires 
that the intentions of those who ratified the Constitution be controlling, rather 
than the intentions of those who merely proposed constitutional anguage for 
popular adoption.50 And, as Brennan cheerfully notes, "'We know practically 
nothing about what went on in the state legislatures' during the process of rati- 
fying the Bill of Rights."'5' 
It is important to understand, however, that these obstacles to historical inter- 
pretation, while formidable, are not necessarily fatal. First, in any given case the 
available historical evidence of intent may be more or less compelling. Second, 
the nature of the evidence that will count as probative of intent may itself be 
entirely a matter of "generally accepted conventions,"52 and hence shaped in a 
manner designed to ease the course of historical inquiry. For example, historical 
interpretation now focuses on the intent of the Constitution's framers, rather 
than of its ratifiers, because the former are by common convention taken to be 
conclusive of the latter. Similarly, The Federalist Papers are by common convention 
now presumed to constitute authoritative (and convenient) evidence of the intent 
of the Framers, although any historian could easily demonstrate the empirical 
inadequacy of the presumption. This tension between the kind of evidence of 
intent necessary to legitimate political authority and the kind of evidence of intent 
necessary to persuade professional historical judgment illustrates the truth of 
22 REPRESENTATIONS 
Nietzsche's remark that "history, so far as it serves life, serves an unhistorical 
power."53 Third, historical interpretation eed not focus on the intentions of the 
Framers or Ratifiers at all, but may attempt instead to ascertain consent through 
inquiries aimed at altogether different kinds of evidence.54 
Ultimately, therefore, the infrequency of historical interpretation in contem- 
porary constitutional interpretation may stem less from evidentiary difficulties 
than from the intrinsic limitations of any theory of interpretation resting on the 
authority of consent. If that authority is understood to arise at the moment of the 
Constitution's ratification, then in fact no living person has "consented" to the 
First Amendment, or indeed to most of the Constitution. Why, it may be asked, 
should the consent of our predecessors have authority over us?55 When faced with 
this difficulty, consent theorists often resort to notions of "implied" or "tacit" con- 
sent, notions that rapidly drain the concept of consent of its ability to legitimate 
authority. These notions have a stopgap, jerry-built quality that renders them 
ultimately unsatisfactory.56 In fact Hanna Pitkin has demonstrated that princi- 
pled consent theorists like Locke orJoseph Tussman, when seriously pressed with 
the absence of actual consent, transform the issue into a question of hypothetical 
consent. "True authority" thus "emerges as being one to which [persons] ought to 
consent, quite apart from whether they have done so."57 
A similar transformation is visible in the arena of constitutional interpreta- 
tion. Thus it is- said that even if the "legitimacy" of the Constitution cannot rest 
upon a prior act of consent, it may nevertheless be founded on the fact that per- 
sons now ought to view it as "a good Constitution and therefore one worthy of 
continuing support."58 This is essentially the form of constitutional authority 
appealed to by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Chambers. Because interpretation 
founded on this form of authority must ultimately be accountable to contempo- 
rary concepts of value, I shall call it "responsive interpretation." 
The authority of ethos. The classic statement of responsive interpretation is by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes: 
When we are dealing with words that are also a constitutent act, like the Constitution of 
the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development 
of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It 
was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken 
a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a 
nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and 
not merely of what was said a hundred years ago.59 
For Holmes the authority of the Constitution is not exhausted in a single creative 
act of consent, but continues to inhere in the national "being" that the Constitu- 
tion has "called into life." Hence the nature of that authority can be captured 
neither by rules laid down in judicial precedents, nor by notions of original inten- 
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation 23 
tion. The authority must rather be conceived as flowing from the "whole ex- 
perience" of nationhood. That experience legitimately claims our allegiance 
because we are necessarily included within it, and hence responsible both for what 
it has been and what it might become. What is authoritative is thus neither more 
nor less than our common commitment to the flourishing of the mutual enter- 
prise of nationhood. 
The radical and paradoxical implication of this perspective is that the Consti- 
tution explicitly loses its character as a specific document or a discrete text. It 
becomes instead, as Karl Llewellyn bluntly put it, a "going Constitution," a 
"working Constitution" which has a content that "is in good part utterly extra- 
Documentary," and which represents the 'fundamental framework" of "the gov- 
ernmental machine."60 In this way the Constitution is transformed into what Kant 
might call the "regulative" idea of the enterprise of constitutional adjudication, 
the "imaginary focus from which the concepts" of that enterprise "seem to pro- 
ceed, even though there is nothing knowable at that focus."'6' 
The Constitution as a regulative idea defines the telos and shape of constitu- 
tional interpretation: it demands a continual effort o articulate the authority of 
our "fundamental nature as a people" and hence concomitantly to summon "us 
to our powers as co-founders and to our responsibilities," in the full knowledge 
that "how we are able to constitute ourselves is profoundly tied to how we are 
already constituted by our own distinctive history."62 In this sense responsive 
interpretation requires judges to view the Constitution as a form of what Philippe 
Nonet and Philip Selznick have called "responsive law," law that submits to "the 
sovereignty of purpose" by functioning "as a facilitator of response to social needs 
and aspirations."63 
There is a tension, however, between using law to implement a succession of 
merely present purposes, and using law to sustain the "general ends"64 constitu- 
tive of our "fundamental framework" of governance. The authority of constitu- 
tional law inheres only in the latter, for it alone claims fidelity to the "whole 
experience" that has comprised "our distinctive history." To maintain its legiti- 
macy, therefore, responsive interpretation must be oriented toward the kind of 
general ends that have been closely linked over the long run to an historical 
instantiation of national identity. But such ends can provide the basis for adjudi- 
cation only if they can also "be made objective enough and authoritative nough 
to control adaptive rule making."65 In this regard Justice Brennan's dissent in 
Chambers is paradigmatic. His effort to inquire into "the underlying function of 
the Establishment Clause" is specific enough to engender legal consequences, but 
general enough to express a deep vision of the secular nature of the American 
state. 
Although the theory of responsive interpretation sounds exotic, responsive 
interpretation is in fact rather common in judicial opinions (certainly much more 
so than historical interpretation). In the area of the First Amendment's guarantee 
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of freedom of speech, for example, the outcome of cases depends upon whether 
judges perceive the purpose of that freedom to be that of assuring an "unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired 
by the people,"66 or instead that of fostering "individual liberty and dignity."67 In 
the area of the constitutional right to privacy, the outcome of cases depends upon 
whether judges conceive the purpose of the Due Process Clause to be that of 
safeguarding those "liberties that are 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition,"68 or instead that of protecting intimate decisions of a kind that "define 
one's identity."69 
Responsive interpretation is in fact a vast umbrella sheltering a myriad of 
different approaches to the Constitution. It need not have the specifically liberal 
cast that is visible in Brennan's dissent in Chambers. It can be used by those who 
stress the constitutional priority of democratic decision making and hence who 
emphasize judicial caution and prudence, as well as by those who stress the con- 
stitutional primacy of individual rights. It has commonly been used byjudges and 
scholars of both the Right and the Left. 
Responsive interpretation does, however, have an important vulnerability. It 
contains within it no particularly persuasive response to the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty. Ifdoctrinal interpretation portrays courts as merely the instruments of 
the law, if historical interpretation portrays courts as merely the instruments of 
an original democratic will, responsive interpretation portrays courts instead as 
arbiters of the fundamental character and objectives of the nation. And why, it 
may be asked, should courts be entrusted to act in that capacity, particularly when 
in doing so they set aside alternative visions of the national character and objec- 
tives propounded by the democratically elected branches of government? 
One possible response to this question, which is increasingly visible in the 
literature, is to stress Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory that all interpretation nec- 
essarily involves a conversation between a reader and a text, and so effects a 
merger between a text and a reader's own purposes and perspectives. Even if this 
theory is accepted, however, it does not repair the vulnerability of responsive 
interpretation. This is because the theory's thrust is entirely to describe the con- 
ditions that make reading possible, and hence it can offer no guidance to the 
judge who, having determined the original intent of the Framers to the best of 
his ability (and therefore in a manner necessarily influenced by his own perspec- 
tive), must decide whether to be bound by that determination (like Chief Justice 
Burger in Chambers), or instead to set it aside in favor of a more self-consciously 
responsive approach (like Justice Brennan in Chambers). The implications of her- 
meneutic insights for theories of constitutional interpretation are thus quite 
modest, a fact that is recognized by its more sophisticated proponents. 
The acknowledgment of these limitations is, for example, the point of David 
Hoy's distinction between the "application" of a text, which is "a prior cognitive 
operation where we first find the text to be saying something to us," and the 
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"appropriation" of a text, which is "a willful, self-conscious act": "Application is 
not an option and is not subjective. But appropriation (e.g., making the text seem 
more rather than less relevant) is an optional strategy, such that it can be used or 
avoided."70 Responsive interpretation is a matter of appropriation, and as such 
cannot be defended by the hermeneutic turn. 
IV 
We are thus in a position to connect each of the three theories of con- 
stitutional interpretation displayed in Chambers to a different conception of con- 
stitutional authority. Doctrinal interpretation, which follows the principle of stare 
decisis, invokes the authority of the Constitution as law. Historical interpretation, 
which implements an original act of will, is validated by the authority of the Con- 
stitution as consent. Responsive interpretation, which engages in an ongoing pro- 
cess of national self-definition, appeals to the authority of the Constitution as, for 
lack of a better word, ethos. 
I will not make the strong claim that these are the only possible conceptions 
of constitutional authority (and hence the only possible theories of constitutional 
interpretation), but I will make the more modest descriptive claim that these three 
conceptions dominate the actual practice of constitutional adjudication. All the 
many methods of constitutional interpretation that have proliferated in the legal 
literature of the past decade, ranging from those that stress the values of demo- 
cratic participation to those that stress the values of autonomous individualism,7' 
ultimately rest upon one or another of these three conceptions of constitutional 
authority. 
Each of these forms of authority is by itself incomplete and incapable of sus- 
taining the enterprise of constitutional adjudication. The authority of the Con- 
stitution as law, for example, requires the authority of either consent or ethos in 
order to initiate a chain of precedents. The authority of consent and that of ethos, 
on the other hand, each require doctrinal elaboration in order to find embodi- 
ment as law. The authority of consent anchors constitutional interpretation in the 
democratic principles that are necessary and desirable in a country like the 
United States, while the authority of ethos offers an indispensable flexibility in 
the interpretation of a document designed to last for the lifetime of the nation. 
Yet if these three forms of authority are on one level systematically interde- 
pendent, they are at a different level potentially divergent and incompatible.72 As 
the Chambers decision illustrates, a court in a constitutional case may be called 
upon to decide which form of authority should govern its efforts, and its decision 
may determine the outcome of the case. Because this decision is most often 
understood to depend upon an antecedent characterization of the Constitution 
26 REPRESENTATIONS 
(as, e.g., "law," "compact," or "ethos"), arguments about theories of interpretation 
commonly modulate into arguments about the inherent "nature" of the Consti- 
tution. To the extent that the three theories of constitutional interpretation are 
perceived as incompatible, it is due to the fact that they are seen as flowing from 
incompatible notions of the Constitution itself. 
But this vision of constitutional authority is fundamentally flawed, for it pos- 
tulates a form of constitutional authority that is external to the processes of its 
own interpretation. It imagines that the nature of the Constitution can somehow 
be determined in a manner which is independent of the practice of constitutional 
interpretation, and that the practice is therefore logically controlled by this ante- 
cedent determination of constitutional authority.73 But a better account of the 
practice of constitutional interpretation would situate constitutional authority 
instead in the relationship obtaining between participants in that practice and the 
Constitution. Paradoxically, then, constitutional interpretation is not merely 
about the Constitution but about the more radical and profound question of how 
we stand in connection to the Constitution. 
The nature of the authority of law. If we ask, for example, what it means to defer 
to the authority of the Constitution as law, the answer is that this authority 
embodies the values of stability, predictability, and reliance which are necessary 
to the legitimacy of any modern legal system. Not only are these values themselves 
important, but they are also the means by which the law orders behavior so as to 
achieve justice and other desired objectives. The authority of the Constitution as 
law flows precisely from the acknowledgment of these values. 
Once this point is made clear, however, it is also evident that these values, no 
matter how important, may or may not be compelling in particular circumstances. 
The values of the rule of law are most pressing when there is agreement that the 
law is generally just and otherwise fulfilling its proper purposes. In such circum- 
stances doctrinal interpretation and the principle of stare decisis hold the law 
steady on its course. But if there is disagreement about the justice of the law, or 
about its purposes, or about its effectiveness in achieving those purposes, then 
the balance can begin to tip away from the values of stability and predictability.74 
At a certain point, when dissatisfaction with the status quo reaches a sufficient 
magnitude, we can expect to see the doctrinal chain snapped.75 
This means, however, that the authority of the Constitution as law does not 
stand outside the processes of constitutional interpretation, like an axiom in a 
geometrical proof, but is rather implicated within that very process. In any spe- 
cific case we may question whether that authority is compelling enough to man- 
date a particular result. Thus it is not the antecedent "nature" of the Constitution 
that requires doctrinal interpretation, but rather the decision to recognize and be 
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bound by the values embodied in the authority of the Constitution as law. By 
acknowledging these values we create a certain relationship to the Constitution, 
one in which the authority of the rule of law becomes visible and pressing. 
In the American legal system this authority appears both flexible and inevi- 
table. It is not disabled even if in particular cases we deny its mandate and break 
with the principle of stare decisis. That is because when the chain of doctrine is 
broken and precedent is either explicitly or effectively overruled, a new decision 
must be announced, and for that decision itself to have any effect, it must be 
crafted in the form of a rule of law that will be respected according to the prin- 
ciple of stare decisis. This means that doctrinal interpretation is presupposed even 
in the moments of its repudiation. Thus although the practice of constitutional 
adjudication at times may and sometimes must depart from doctrinal interpre- 
tation, it is a form of interpretation to which the practice will also inevitably 
return. 
The symmetrical nature of the authority of consent and the authority of ethos. If doc- 
trinal interpretation views the Constitution only dimly at one end of a long cor- 
ridor of precedents, historical and responsive interpretation each confront the 
Constitution, so to speak, face to face. The directness of this inquiry liberates 
courts from the chains of doctrine, and empowers them to alter and amend pre- 
cedents. It also empowers them to uncover and articulate substantive constitu- 
tional values. For historical interpretation, this power rests on a court's claim to 
speak with the authority of an original act of consent. For responsive interpreta- 
tion, this power rests on a court's claim to speak with the authority of our deepest 
national identity and commitments. Although these claims appear on their sur- 
face to be very different, as different as Burger's majority opinion in Chambers 
from Brennan's dissent, in fact they each share an underlying structural 
similarity. 
The authority of consent rests on the capacity of the individual voluntarily to 
assume obligations. Absent special circumstances to the contrary, a person's con- 
tracts are viewed as binding and authoritative. This fact has important conse- 
quences for constitutional interpretation. Imagine the dismay you would feel, for 
example, if you were to have worked for and achieved the ratification of a con- 
stitutional amendment, say the Equal Rights Amendment, only to have it inter- 
preted by a court in a manner flatly contrary to your intent and to the intent of 
the amendment's supporters and ratifiers. In such circumstances you would want 
ajudge to subordinate her personal perspectives and faithfully to implement the 
act of consent by virtue of which the amendment had become authoritative. You 
would no doubt experience ajudge's departure from this duty as a betrayal. 
The appeal of historical interpretation trades on this experience of betrayal. 
It is important to understand, however, that this experience does not depend 
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upon anything so simple as the physical casting of a vote. Constitutional amend- 
ments are ratified, not by general elections, but by state legislatures or special state 
conventions. Your experience of betrayal would depend, not upon whether you 
personally were a member of one of these special ratifying bodies, but rather 
upon your identification with those who had physically signified their consent. 
What would count is your sense that the members of the state legislatures or 
conventions who had actually assented to the Equal Rights Amendment spoke 
"for" you. 
This same identification can extend in time as well as in space. Thus when 
confronted with constitutional provisions that are a century or more old, histor- 
ical interpretation can be understood implicitly to assert an identification, a com- 
munity of interest, with the framers or ratifiers of those provisions. "Their" 
consent, so the implicit assertion would go, is "our" consent; they spoke "for" us. 
It follows that the authority of historical interpretation will in significant measure 
depend upon the persuasiveness of that assertion. That is why in Chambers Chief 
Justice Burger offers an extended discussion of "the unambiguous and unbroken 
history of more than two hundred years," which he claims establishes "that the 
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric 
of our society."76 The power of Burger's opinion rests in the end upon a claimed 
continuity of identification with those who had proposed and ratified the First 
Amendment. 
This claim, however, is neither more nor less than a characterization of the 
national ethos. It is a claim about our national identity and history. Thus while 
the debate between majority and dissent in Chambers can at one level be seen as 
struggle between historical and responsive interpretation, it can at a deeper level 
be understood as a disagreement about whether we can now identify with our 
ancestors, or whether we have over the centuries become so different from them, 
so much more secular or diverse, that we have lost any persuasive identification 
with the consent of those who ratified the First Amendment.77 
This deep symmetry between historical and responsive interpretation stems 
from the fact that both ultimately flow from the authority of a will that affirms its 
own identity.78 Responsive interpretation makes this authority explicit, because it 
openly affirms responsibility for the nature of our national ethos. While historical 
interpretation seemingly presents itself as a self-denying submission to the iden- 
tity of past ratifiers, closer analysis reveals that that identity is authoritative only 
insofar as we can be persuaded to adopt it as our own.79 In either case, the 
authority of the Constitution ceases to stand apart from the processes of its inter- 
pretation. That authority does not flow from the antecedent nature of the Con- 
stitution, but rather from the particular relationship we have forged with the 
Constitution. 
In this regard, however, responsive interpretation is unique, for it alone 
explicitly thematizes this relational nature of constitutional authority. Both his- 
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torical and doctrinal interpretation purport to submit to a Constitution whose 
authority is independent and fixed, either in the preexisting consent of the rati- 
fiers or in the preexisting rules of controlling precedents. Although this sub- 
mission is illusory, it is an illusion capable of disarming dissent. Responsive in- 
terpretation, however, disavows this illusion, and frankly locates constitutional 
authority in the relationship between the Constitution and its interpreters. As a 
consequence responsive interpretation generates an intense and singular kind of 
political dynamics. 
A good example is Brown v. Board of Education.80 The decision did not turn on 
what the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought,8' nor on what the 
Court had previously held in Plessy v. Ferguson.82 Instead the ideal of racial equality 
had become so pressing to the Court that there was no alternative but to interpret 
the Equal Protection Clause in light of its imperatives. But precisely because this 
interpretation rested upon an open avowal of a national ideal, Brown represented 
a courageous gamble. The Court's embrace of the value of racial equality could 
have been a misreading of the national ethos; indeed the Court's gamble was 
intensely controversial and came close to failing precisely because that ethos was 
in fact so divided.83 
By refusing to interpret the Constitution as if it were a source of external 
compulsion, either of past precedent or of past consent, responsive interpretation 
always places a court in such an exposed position, purporting to speak for the 
fundamental ethos of the contemporary community, but justified in the end only 
by the wisdom of its own insight. Under conditions of cultural division, that posi- 
tion can be the platform for a special form of leadership (as in Brown), or it can 
be the cause of the most unhappy form of vulnerability (as in Roe v. Wade). 
Roe, which at the time of its decision stood without significant historical or 
precedential support,84 illustrates the structural vulnerability of responsive inter- 
pretation to the charge that it articulates values that are merely local and partisan, 
rather than general and truly constitutive of the nation. The charge is unlikely to 
surface when there is cultural consensus, because the invocation of contemporary 
values will under such circumstances be unobtrusive and perhaps even unno- 
ticed. But in the absence of consensus the frank ambition of responsive interpre- 
tation to "speak for" the character of the nation, while expressive of the outlook 
of some, will necessarily constitute a hegemonic imposition upon others.85 Thus 
the enterprise of responsive interpretation can become the locus of an overt 
struggle for the definition of national identity. In the legal academy responsive 
interpretation has been profoundly controversial because of the unease gener- 
ated by perceived judicial participation in such a struggle. 
Paradoxically, however, the root cause of this unease is precisely responsive 
interpretation's explicit thematization of the relational nature of constitutional 
authority, a form of authority that it in fact shares with both historical and doc- 
trinal interpretation. 
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The inevitability of responsive interpretation. Responsive interpretation is in some 
respects similar to what in the contemporary legal literature is called "noninter- 
pretivism,"86 which can roughly be defined as that form of constitutional inter- 
pretation which seeks "the principal stuff of constitutional judgment in one's 
rendition of society's fundamental values rather than in the document's broader 
themes."87 Noninterpretivism, and by extension responsive interpretation, is fre- 
quently attacked as breaking faith with a judge's obligation to interpret the Con- 
stitution rather than to enact her own desires. 
Understood in a psychological sense, the attack is clearly justified. If a judge 
believes that the Constitution means X, but the judge decides Y because she pre- 
fers Y, the judge's decision is presumptively illegitimate. But this framing of the 
issue is ultimately trivial, for it proceeds on an assumption of bad faith, and it 
prejudges the critical question, which is the nature of that Constitution to which 
the judge should maintain fidelity. If noninterpretivism is defined as rendering 
judgment upon the basis of extraconstitutional factors, then it will of course be 
vulnerable, but only in an uninteresting and merely stipulative sense. Properly 
understood, however, responsive interpretation avoids this vulnerability by 
including the additional claim that our "fundamental nature as a people" is part 
of the legitimate authority of the Constitution. 
One objection to responsive interpretation, therefore, is that it mistakes the 
"root premise" of American constitutionalism, which is "that the Supreme Court, 
like the other branches of government, is constrained by the written constitu- 
tion."88 The point is that responsive interpretation, which explicitly dissolves the 
Constitution as a specific written text, rests on an unacceptable notion of the Con- 
stitution. The force of this objection, which is considerable, derives from the cir- 
cumstance in which the words of the Constitution appear to speak plainly to us. 
Recall the case of the third California senator, which a court could settle merely 
by reading the text of the document. In such a case it seems as if the document 
itself were authoritative, as if meaning flowed naturally from that handwritten, 
hand-signed parchment kept under glass in the National Archives.89 It would 
appear to follow that any theory of interpretation which abandons that document 
is illegitimate. 
This reasoning, however, proves far too much. It is true that when the doc- 
ument's meaning is unproblematic we feel constrained to regard its language as 
authoritative without further inquiry. But when for whatever reason the docu- 
ment's meaning does seem problematic, we are necessarily forced outside the text 
in search of some authority to guide our interpretation of the text. Thus every 
theory of constitutional interpretation is at some level inconsistent with the notion 
of a narrow fidelity to a written document. Doctrinal interpretation, for example, 
which is the sine qua non of constitutional adjudication, applies not the words of 
the document, but legal rules that judges have subsequently created. Most con- 
stitutional cases are decided on the basis of doctrinal "tests" that have very little 
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to do with the text of the parchment which resides in the National Archives. Even 
historical interpretation looks for authority not to the text of the written docu- 
ment, but rather to the consent of those who agreed to it. The charge that respon- 
sive interpretation abandons the written document, therefore, is an accusation 
that would disqualify virtually all forms of constitutional interpretation. 
A second objection to responsive interpretation, however, is that it abandons 
the document in a particularly unacceptable way. Historical interpretation 
focuses on an original act of consent because that consent "points toward" the 
document and illuminates its specific meaning. Doctrinal interpretation, it might 
be said, focuses on rules of precedent because such rules also "point toward" the 
document and are attempts to elucidate its meaning. Responsive interpretation, 
on the other hand, turns away from the document altogether in an effort to 
uncover present values. 
This objection captures what I take to be a major animus of the contemporary 
debate, and for that reason it needs to be carefully parsed. It is true that because 
historical interpretation looks to the consent of the ratifiers, the historical docu- 
ment actually ratified is central to the interpretative nterprise. But doctrinal 
interpretation can be said to "point toward" that document only in the most atten- 
uated metaphorical sense, a sense in which it is equally true to say that responsive 
interpretation "points toward" the document. 
Responsive interpretation rests on the claim that the Constitution is not "static 
and lifeless," to use Brennan's words in Chambers. Instead, as Holmes put it, the 
Constitution is understood as having "called into life a being" that, like any 
"organism," must grow and develop on the basis of its "experience."90 Thus the 
ambition and challenge of responsive interpretation is to determine which aspects 
of our contemporary ethos may be regarded as legitimate "growth from the seeds 
which the fathers planted," and hence as bearing "the essential content and the 
spirit of the Constitution."9' Only these aspects of the national ethos are geneti- 
cally related to the document and thus may properly form the basis for responsive 
interpretation. In this sense responsive interpretation does indeed "point (back- 
ward) toward" the document, in at least as strong a metaphoric sense as does 
doctrinal interpretation. 
Admittedly the organic metaphor that underlies this account of responsive 
interpretation is highly problematic. It is important to understand, however, that 
responsive interpretation could equally well rest upon other and perhaps more 
convincing metaphors. It could invoke, for example, the image of an evolving 
"tradition" that is constitutive of cultural meaning.92 Or it could adopt the socio- 
logical language of communitarianism, as in this passage from Philip Selznick: 
A social contract is a constitutive contract. Its function is to create a political community by 
founding the legitimacy of government on the consent of the governed. Once the com- 
munity is formed it has a logic and a dynamic of its own. Even the fundamental obligations 
of government and citizenry-obligations ofloyalty, self-restraint, and care-flow from 
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the nature of the community and of its historical premises, not from the terms of an 
agreement.93 
Each of these metaphors can be used to describe a national ethos that both 
changes over time and yet also manages to retain a distinctive identity. Each por- 
trays a national ethos in which we are implicated, and to which we are therefore 
responsible. Each is therefore capable of sustaining the enterprise of responsive 
interpretation. 
In these heady days of postmodernism, of course, it is easy enough to deny 
the truth of all these metaphors, and to repudiate the very existence of any over- 
arching national ethos. The political consequences of such a denial, however, are 
grim. They were in fact first systematically articulated by Thomas Hobbes, and 
today the premises of his work remain visible in the writings of those influenced 
by economics and public choice theory. A clear example can be found in the views 
of a constitutional scholar like Robert Bork, who argues that there is no such thing 
as a distinctive national ethos, but only a vast collection of individual prefer- 
ences.94 It follows from this perspective that any attempt to interpret the Consti- 
tution on the basis of the authority of a national ethos will necessarily degenerate 
into an unwarranted imposition of private judicial preferences.95 
Two preliminary points should be made about this perspective. First, it is 
inconsistent with historical interpretation, with which it is sometimes associated. 
Historical interpretation rests on the implicit assertion that the national ethos 
supports an identification with the ratifiers of the Constitution. But if there are 
only discrete individual preferences, and if the nation does not have any national 
ethos, there is no reason whatever why the consent of those long dead should 
hold any particular authority for the present generation. Second, as the example 
of Hobbes illustrates, this perspective has difficulty offering a plausible account 
of political authority as anything other than a collective need for forceful and 
clear rules of conduct to save individuals from the destructive consequences of 
their own egoism. But this form of authority, stressing as it does the values of 
continuity and predictability, is compatible only with the authority of the Consti- 
tution as law, which is to say with doctrinal interpretation. The actual implication 
of this perspective, therefore, is that the principle of stare decisis hould hold until 
interrupted by contemporaneous processes of constitutional amendment. 
The consequences of denying the existence of a national ethos are thus dra- 
matic, far-reaching, and singularly unattractive. It transforms the overriding con- 
cern of constitutional adjudication into the maintenance of rules (any rules), for 
only such rules stand between us and a chaos of individual desires. Because the 
primary objective of these rules will be the preservation of order, those subject to 
constitutional rules will necessarily be reduced "to mere objects of the adminis- 
tered life."96 The Constitution is thus ultimately converted into a form of "repres- 
sive law" that "gives short shrift to the interests of the governed."97 
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This transformation is relevant to an assessment of the position of scholars 
like Bork. Although the existence or absence of a national ethos appears at first 
blush to be an empirical question that is independent of the perspective of a court, 
in fact matters are not so simple. As the example of Brown v. Board of Education 
illustrates, a court can, through the eloquent articulation of public ideals, actually 
help to solidify a national ethos. The national ethos to which responsive interpre- 
tation appeals, in other words, may in significant ways be affected by the very 
practice of responsive interpretation. The question facing a court, therefore, is 
whether it should interpret the Constitution in ways that may express or establish 
a national ethos, or whether it should do so in ways that may confirm its absence. 
I think this question answers itself, which is why constitutional interpretation has 
never at any time proceeded on Hobbesian premises. 
There is, however, yet a fourth objection to responsive interpretation, one 
which exerts considerably more influence than the Hobbesian perspective. It does 
not deny that the nation has an ethos which forms an important component of 
its public life, but it contends that it is inappropriate for judges to appeal to that 
ethos as a form of constitutional authority, because the conservation and articu- 
lation of that ethos should be placed in the hands of democratically elected offi- 
cials rather than judges. The objection, in other words, rests on an institutional 
analysis of how courts ought to function in a democracy. It is of course on pre- 
cisely such institutional considerations that the counter-majoritarian difficulty is
ultimately founded. The stubborn persistence of the difficulty suggests the pres- 
ence of powerful truths that cannot be brushed aside. 
They are, however, only partial truths. If the Constitution is not to degen- 
erate into merely repressive law, authoritative only because of the need for clear 
and predictable rules, courts interpreting the Constitution must be allowed to 
speak from the authority of a national ethos, in the form of either historical or 
responsive interpretation. Taken to its logical conclusion, therefore, the counter- 
majoritarian difficulty leads to exactly the same unacceptable vision of constitu- 
tional law as that which flows from overtly Hobbesian premises.98 But this con- 
sequence is unacceptable to proponents of the counter-majoritarian difficulty, for 
the institutional considerations by which they seek to circumscribe judicial power 
are themselves based on a particular account of the national ethos, one that char- 
acteristically stresses the importance of majority will in the form of government 
created by the Constitution.99 Proponents of the counter-majoritarian difficulty 
are thus torn between their account of appropriate institutional principles and 
the fact that these principles, if fully implemented, would preclude judges from 
appealing to the very national ethos from which the principles flow. 
Institutional objections to responsive interpretation are consequently riven 
by internal tensions. For this very reason, however, institutional objections have 
rarely if ever implied a simple repudiation of responsive interpretation. Instead 
they have characteristically generated counsels of caution, urgent recommenda- 
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tions that responsive interpretation be used only sparingly and in ways consonant 
with the underlying conception of the national ethos upon which the institutional 
objections are themselves based. They have led, in other words, to forms of 
responsive interpretation based upon a particular understanding of the national 
ethos as founded upon majoritarian principles.'00 
V 
The fact that identical judges use different heories of constitutional 
interpretation in different cases is often used as evidence of the unprincipled 
nature of constitutional aw. And, indeed, if the choice of an interpretative theory 
depended on the nature of the Constitution, and if that nature were antecedently 
and externally given, it would be difficult o condone the ways in which judges 
actually use interpretative theories. But if, as I have argued, constitutional inter- 
pretation depends instead upon a relational concept of constitutional authority, 
judges can legitimately select a specific interpretative theory in light of the cir- 
cumstances of a particular case. 
Thus a court can justifiably use historical interpretation with respect to an 
issue in a case if it believes that the national ethos supports an identification with 
a past act of consent relevant to that issue. But it can justifiably use responsive 
interpretation if it can discern with respect to that issue the presence of a national 
ethos that in a pertinent way historically embodies the essential content and spirit 
of the Constitution, and that precludes identification with any past act of consent. 
Hence the choice between historical and responsive interpretation can turn on 
an appraisal of the national ethos. 
The selection of doctrinal interpretation entails a different kind of appraisal, 
one that requires a court to determine whether the values of the rule of law out- 
weigh the inadequacy of controlling precedents. An important reason why pre- 
cedents may be inadequate is that they are inconsistent with the interpretation of 
the Constitution required by the national ethos, either in the form of historical 
or responsive interpretation. The striking of this balance between the rule of law 
and the national ethos is both necessary and legitimate. 
Thus the selection of a specific theory of constitutional interpretation for a 
particular case can be justified in the same way that any legal decision can be 
justified. Justification flows not from logical compulsion but rather from the prin- 
cipled application of pertinent considerations. Constitutional adjudication, like 
all law, is in this way revealed as balanced on the human faculty of judgment. As 
in all human endeavor, pertinent considerations may be more or less compelling, 
and consequently the ability to exercise judgment more or less sustained. 
Nevertheless, the pattern ofjudgment in constitutional aw can reveal a good 
deal about the nature of fundamental authority in our democratic state. It sug- 
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gests, for example, that visions of the national ethos, and hence of a "humanly 
meaningful authority,'' are at the core of our practice of constitutional adjudi- 
cation. This is encouraging news to set against the view of those who, like Jurgen 
Habermas and others, perceive the tidal current of this century as flowing toward 
"undeviating organization,"'102 with its concomitant conditions of bureaucracy, 
alienation, deracination, and instrumental rationality. But it is also cause for con- 
cern if, as appears increasingly likely to be the case for many of us, the vision of 
national ethos authoritatively enacted by the Supreme Court is contrary to our 
own. Our consolation in such circumstances is the strength that Claude Lefort 
identifies with modern democracy: the ever-present possibility that our protests 
will create a reconstituted political perspective that will in turn alter the character 
of future judicial appointments. 
But that possibility, of course, simply pulls Ernest Chambers round full circle, 
back to his original efforts to convince his fellow legislators of the deep imperti- 
nence of legislative prayer. 
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